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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The opinion originally issued in this matter correctly
mandates that the State should be prevented from making reference
to the Section 76-5-202(1)(q), Utah Code, aggravating factor in the
penalty trial on remand because of the principal of res judicata.
This Court did not misconstrue or overlook material facts,
statutes, or decisions, or base its original decision on some wrong
principal of law, or misapply or overlook something which
materially affected its original decision. The original opinion
should therefore not be reconsidered or reheard.

ARGUMENT
AT THE REMANDED PENALTY TRIAL, PRINCIPALS OF RES JUDICATA
PREVENT THE STATE FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE, REQUESTING
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, ARGUING, OR OTHERWISE RE-LITIGATING
WHETHER APPELLANT'S ACTS WERE COMMITTED IN AN ESPECIALLY
HEINOUS, ATROCIOUS, CRUEL, OR EXCEPTIONALLY DEPRAVED
MANNER.
Respondent recognizes that the original jury in this case was
misinstructed at both the guilt and penalty phases as to the
meaning of the Section 76-5-202(1)(q) aggravating factor.
Nevertheless, Respondent argues that at the remanded penalty trial
it should be allowed to introduce evidence relevant to such
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aggravating factor, properly instruct the new jury on its meaning,
and re-argue the identical issue litigated at the original guilt
and penalty trials because Section 76-3-207(2) does not preclude
introduction of such aggravating factor but rather allows
introduction of "any matter the court deems relevant to sentence,
...."

The State argues that it could have chosen to allege and

prove any one of the statutory aggravating factors of Section 76-5202 while reserving any other one or more of such aggravating
factors for use at the penalty phase. The crux of Respondent's
argument is that the State does not need to properly prove an
aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt at the guilt phase as
a prerequisite to use of the same factor at the penalty phase.
Respondent may well be correct in this interpretation of its
parameters under Section 77-3-207(2). It appears that the section
probably does not specifically prevent the state from arguing an
aggravating factor that it did not allege or attempt to prove at
the guilt phase. And, the aggravating factors of Section 76-5-2 02
are specifically designated as aggravating factors for purposes of
sentencing, as well. It appears that had the State only alleged and
put on evidence as to one aggravating factor, Section 76-3-207(2)
would not have directly and independently prevented it from
introducing evidence on and arguing an entirely different
aggravating factor at the penalty phase.
3

However, Respondent argues principals that apply to
circumstances which are not relevant to the present status of the
case. The State is not now attempting to argue an aggravating
factor that was reserved or "held back" from the original guilt or
penalty trials. Rather, Respondent urges that an issue that it has
previously and vigorously argued and lost should be re-litigated on
remand. Had the State - in both the original guilty and penalty
trials - not introduced evidence, requested instructions, and
argued the identical issue, its position in the Petition may be
well taken. But the State is now attempting to argue for the use
and application of the 76-5-202(1)(q) aggravating factor as if for
the first time. And, the principals of res judicata prevent the
State from introducing and arguing what the statutory law would
otherwise allow.
"Although the concept of res judicata and collateral estoppel
originally developed in connection with civil litigation, they
apply in criminal as well as civil cases;" 21 Am Jur 2nd 560,
section 321, citing cases including Hoaa v New Jersey, 356 US 464
and State v Erwin, 120 P2nd 285. This Court has previously
determined that the principal of res judicata is comprised of two
separate concepts, ie: claim preclusion and issue preclusion,
Searle Bros, v Searle, 588 P2nd 689, Penrod v Nu Creation Creme,
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Inc., 669 P2nd 873, Noble v Noble, 761 P2nd 1369, and Madsen v
Borthwick. 769 P2nd 245. This Court has likewise ruled thatUnder the rules of issue preclusion, the
adjudication of an issue bars its re-litigation in
another action only if four requirements are met. First,
the issue in both cases must be identical. Second, the
judgment must be final with respect to that issue. Third,
the issue must have been fully, fairly, and competently
litigated in the first action. Fourth, the party who is
precluded from litigating the issue must be either a
party to the first action or a privy of a party. Madsen,
supra.
It seems clear that the "heinous/atrocious" issue as well as
the parties in the original trial are identical to those in the
trial on remand and that the "heinous/atrocious11 issue, being
central to the capital charge as well as to the determination of
sentencing, was fairly and completely litigated in the former
trials. What is not so clear is whether the issue has reached final
judgment and whether the prior proceedings constitute "another
action" as that term applies to the principal of issue preclusion.
The proper sentence to be imposed in this matter is, of
course, not finally determined. However, whether or not Appellant
committed an "heinous\atrocious" act has been finally determined by
virtue of this Court's reversal of that part the verdict and
judgment based on a finding that that aggravating factor had been
committed. The State has already attempted and failed to establish
the merits of that issue. This Court has previously ruled that a
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claim is finally determined if decided on its merits, Madsen,
supra. Finality for purposes of issue preclusion would seem to be
best assessed by the same standards. If so assessed, this issue has
reached final judgment.
This counsel has been unable to discover case authority
bearing directly on the issue of whether Appellant's previous guilt
trial constitutes "another action" viz a viz his upcoming remanded
penalty trial, or whether guilt trials generally constitute actions
which are considered separate from penalty trials, with respect to
the principals of issue preclusion. However, if the underlying
concept of issue preclusion is to preclude re-litigation of an
issue which has been fully, fairly, and competently litigated by
the same parties (as is the case here), then a strict adherence to
an otherwise commonly recognized definition of the term would
thwart the spirit of the principal. The emphasis should be on the
fact that the State has already been afforded a fair opportunity to
establish this same issue as against this same Appellant in another
setting (the guilt phase). That the other setting does not have a
different case number or isn't brought in a separate Information
and thus may not constitute "another action" as that term is
customarily used, should not be determinative.
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CONCLUSIONS
The "heinous\atrocious" allegation against Appellant was
fully, fairly, completely, and competently litigated between these
same parties in a previous adversarial setting. While the
directives of the relevant statutory law might otherwise seem to
allow the State to introduce evidence on this same issue at the
remanded penalty trial, principals of issue preclusion preclude the
State from reasserting and protect Appellant from re-defending
against the same issue. Correct application of the principals of
issue preclusion to the facts of this case will not broadly nor
improperly affect the State's claimed statutory right in other
future cases to pick and "reserve" proof of aggravating factors for
use in penalty phases, only. This Court has not overlooked or
misapplied an issue of fact or law which would justify reargument,
rehearing, or other modification of its original decision.

Dated this 5th day of July, 1989.

-rC/f
THOMAS H. MEANS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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